[This letter was written in an exchange about a year ago, but we consider it to remain relevant today. - Arch Stanton, June 2, 2002]
Dear Friend,
I have just returned from retreat and found your letter. As you both e-mailed and snail-mailed it, it seems that you are authentically asking for response, rather than writing rhetorical questions, so here goes.
Because I believe that the view presented in your letter is fundamentally flawed, and leads to flawed conclusions, I would like to answer in some detail. To evaluate a statement, within a given context, via the methods of valid reasoning and logical analysis, is not obviated by the possibility of multiple perceptions. This is the crux of the matter and we will return to it after a bit of background. It seems to me that the real, though more uncomfortable, question is not why do I fail to choose to see Surya Das by two views at once, but why I think that, within the context of Buddhism, your view is wrong.
Your letter raises an interesting point regarding the relativity of perception and evaluation of perception. You mention that there may be more than one way to perceive Surya Das. You wonder why I seem to persist in seeing him in a negative light rather than also seeing that he may be a great master, Padmasambhava in person, or a Terton. The general slant of your point finds deep roots in Buddhist teachings of both emptiness and the corollary teachings on dependent origination. In order to understand where we agree and where we diverge in view, I think it is worth considering these teachings briefly.
Emptiness and dependent origination are obviously the lynch pins when exploring the ramifications of the relativity of perception. The sublime Mahayana writings divulge the Buddha's vision of the emptiness of self and object. Nagarjuna's laser precision drove the nail in the coffin of "ultimacy" in regard to linguistic propositions of ultimacy. I personally find the Avatamsaka Sutra and works of the Hwa Yen School's poetic elaboration and interpretation of this sutra to be both beautiful and profound. The teachings on the interpenetrating and mutually non-obstructing nature of alternative visions are directly related to the issue at hand.
It might be best to look at relative interpretations of a neutral subject, such as water, prior to moving on to Surya Das. A thirsty person sees water as a delightful drink. A person with dirty hands sees it as a cleaning fluid. A chemist might see it as H2O or a physicist might perceive it as a collection of atomic and subatomic interactions within a particular pattern. A hot hell realm being, dying of thirst but lost in the ferocity of severely negative karma, might see it as liquid fire that is to be avoided at all cost. By a water bug it is seen as a strong surface for skimming about on. On a hot summer day it might be seen as playfulness substance for jumping and swimming in. A Buddhist analyst might see it as manifest causality or the union of emptiness and form or perhaps even the Dakini Mamaki. One can go on and on. All of these differing perceptions arise simultaneously, not one after the other, and they are mutually interpenetrating and non-obstructing. Like the multifarious reflections in a mirror, all the ways of seeing water and relating to water exist in simultaneous mutual containment as relative perceptions within the great wholeness of mysterious reality.
What water "is" is a pointless question, as water "is" only in the interdependence between substance and perceiver. It is a bit like the silly question, "If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound?" Certainly it makes measurable vibrational patterns carried through the air, but these become sound in interdependence with the interaction between vibration, eardrum, brain and conceptuality.
So when you say, "It seems that there are two ways one might take Surya's writings," (and since you go on to describe possible ways of perceiving the man himself, i.e. a Terton, Padmasambhava himself; I assume we are also speaking of multiple ways of seeing the writings and the man), I agree and disagree. Certainly there are multiple interpenetrating and mutually non-obstructing vantage points. In this we agree. I would say there are many more than two. There are many ways one might take Surya's writings or Surya himself. There is the fashion in which I approach these. There is your suggestion to see Surya as Padmasambhava himself. There is the stance of my Southern Baptist friend that Surya, me and you are all simply going to hell and there is no point in arguing the fine points of our shared blasphemy. There is the vision of the bear which lives on our retreat land - to whom Surya, you and I might be a good dinner. As with water, the list can go on and on.
So we agree that there may be multiple vantage points each having some validity based on the karma and circumstances of the perceiver. Multiplicities of perception may exist simultaneously. These perceptions may differ radically and yet not obstruct the validity of each other. Water is a plaything, cleaning fluid and a drink as well as liquid fire. Hitler may be viewed as a genocidal madman to be loathed or, by his mom, as a lovable son. This analysis, of course, applies to everything and everyone: Adolf Hitler, Winston Churchill, Benny Hill, potatoes, goldfish, stars and kittens.
With this small background I can go ahead and answer the first of your two questions: "I wonder why you chose to see only one aspect of Surya?" It might be worth stating, at the outset, that you (you in this case) cannot determine how I chose, or am compelled through karmas, to "see" Surya Das. One can only deduce what view of Surya Das's work I feel is both erroneous and harmful and therefore important enough to write about. The crux of the problem, as I see it, is that a) you imply there are only two ways one might see Surya Das and his writings, and b) that we cannot make validity judgments about interpretative statements deduced from our perception. It is further implied that there might be a benefit to uncritically accepting any and all perceptions and interpretations.
Implication a) is wrong because, as described above, the basis on which one might accept two views opens perception to a much wider array than two. At the same time, and without contradiction, implication b) is wrong for reasons I will go into below.
You say there are two views and then state each in brief form: first my negative assessment of Surya Das's writings and then your statement that we might see Surya Das as a great master, as Padmasambhava himself or as a Terton working for the benefit of all beings. Then you ask why I chose to see only one aspect of Surya Das, which is of course asking why I chose not to agree with your assessment as well as my own.
The reason is that your assessment is wrong. The fact is that there are many possible ways of seeing something or someone. Each "way of perceiving" is "true" in the sense that the person or being actually perceives this. It does not mean that it has any validity outside of merely being a statement about the perception of the being in question. It also does not mean that statements cannot be evaluated for validity in terms of given definitions within specific relative fields. Absolute truth does not negate relative truth and within the domain of relative truth, many statements can be tested for validity based on set parameters of evaluation.
Someone might see Hitler as a being to be loathed, a being to be pitied, or a being to be loved, dependent upon their relationship with him. One might see all three of these at once or sequentially in the context of a changing relationship, but the hermeneutics of perception is not the point right now. All these might be "correct." Someone undergoing serious psychotic hallucinations may see Hitler as a tree or sofa or as the historical Jesus or Mohammed Ali. That they physically and mentally perceive this is true. It is also true that their vantage point will co-exist in interpenetrating mutual non-obstruction with all others. At the same time, based on the standard definition of a tree, we can say that Hitler is not a tree. We can also say that he is not the historical Jesus. If I ask, "Is it raining on the yard outside my house?" and you say, "Yes" but no precipitation is falling, then you are wrong. Every day we make countless common sense judgments about the validity of statements and perceptions without any problems. The possibility of multiple perceptions does not imply an impossibility of validating those perceptions within the context of the realm in which they are made. It does not obviate the possibility of valid reasoning or logical deduction. If a scientist says water is H3O then this is wrong.
To evaluate a statement within a given context via the methods of valid reasoning and logical analysis is one thing. To merely state the possibility of perceiving something in one or another fashion with no reference to the validity of that perception is quite another. You state two possible perceptions of Surya Das and then go on to act as if the existence of these possible perceptions also gave them equal validity within the context of Buddhism. This is, of course, a serious error.
To understand this better, let's look at another example. For instance, a metal cog within a watch. In the context of the watch, the cog has a particular place and function. If the insides of a watch are placed on the table there are many "valid" ways one might perceive these objects. The mother of a baby might see them as a choking threat; the child might see them as playthings. These two perceptions might be in conflict with one another but both can be understood. Someone might analyze the cogs according to their metallic make-up. An artist might view them as pieces for "found object" art. A person who wants to build a watch will see them as the parts of a watch and will understand the relationship between the differing parts of the watch. The watch maker will be able to place the cogs together in an extremely limited number of ways in order to end up with a working watch. In order to make use of the parts, he must make judgments about their function, in relation to his objective, and these judgments can have validity or lack validity. They can be right or wrong. The fact that such judgments are "relative" does not mean that they are relative within the context of the particular objective.
The mother's perception is not made wrong by the child's or the watch maker's and vice versa, but the watch maker's judgment about the function of the parts in relation to the objective of building a watch can be right or wrong. Even the mother's analysis of the parts as choking threats can be right or wrong, based on the comparative size of the parts and the child's throat. When you say, "It seems that there are two ways one might take Surya's writings," and ask why I do not accept your way, you imply that the validity of both is assumed or at least incapable of validation by any criteria related to the context at hand which is, of course, Buddhism. Within the shallow waters of New Age philosophy there is a trend to view all truths as equal and of course this trend is so lacking in even the most superficial logical analysis that it is barely worthy of mention. In the Buddhist world there is a tendency to play absolute and relative truths off against one another ending in the same vapid results. I will not insult you by attributing these clichéd stances to you. Such schmaltz does not even deserve response. I would, however, suggest that the presumption that differing viewpoints are to be assumed to both be valid, without well-reasoned argument, is not credible.
Neither Prajnaparamita doctrines, the Hwa Yen schools nor the Dzogpa Chenpo doctrines subvert the basis for valid argument in terms of particular relative domains, dogmas or methods. To use these doctrines in such a manner is to play the old shell and coin game with Dharma. In this game there are three shells and a coin is put under one and they are then switched around very quickly. When they come to rest, the contestant has to guess which shell the coin is under. The trick is that the coin has surreptitiously been slipped into the hand of the confidence man and no guess can be the correct one. I am not saying that this is what you are doing, but I am unclear how I could accept your letter's view without it.
It seems to me that the real, though more uncomfortable, question is not why I chose one view of Surya Das but why I think that, within the context of Buddhism, you are wrong and I am right. There is tremendous reluctance in our culture for anyone to ever say, "I think I am right and you are wrong." Personally I think this reluctance finds its origin not in tolerance of diversity, but in a twofold combination of nihilistic relativity and our deep-seated fear of our suppressed rage.
When ideas and philosophies are treated as vital, powerful aspects of the human experience that shapes our lives, then debate between ideas and viewpoints is understood to be crucial and healthy. In a nihilistic vision, life itself has no real value and no view matters enough to be debated. In our post-modern nihilistic and materialistic culture, with its rage simmering beneath the surface, people fear that any solid, strong disagreement might cause this rage to surface. It is possible to disagree, even strongly, vehemently, and never lose sight of the intrinsic human value of the other. It is possible to debate viewpoints and not stray from the contemplations on equanimity and loving-kindness taught in the precious Buddhadharma. It is not only possible, it is vital, because not all views lead to the end of suffering. Because of the four noble truths, because we have taken the Bodhisattva vow, life has great preciousness and meaning. Because our view shapes our actions and our actions determine the vectoral direction of our being, either towards liberation or further delusion, it is important to consider with care what views we accept and what views we reject.
In the relative world of human beings one might have many views of Surya Das and his writings. One may view him as a heretic or one may view him as the Buddha Padmasambhava. Both of these views will arise in dependence on circumstances. I come to my view of Surya Das and his writings based on the criteria of the Nyingma Vajrayana system of Buddhism, which Surya Das also claims as the foundation of his teaching and writing. Because we share this context we can make valid assessments of philosophical views from the axioms of this path. You suggest I view Surya Das as a Buddha, as Padmasambhava himself and perhaps as a Terton. It is my feeling that, using the teachings of the Nyingma lineage of Vajrayana Buddhism - Surya Das's and my shared context - I can determine these views as false.
There are only a few basic irrevocable criteria within the Buddhadharma which serve as the axioms for the methodology of differing yanas. There are the four noble truths, the teachings on emptiness and anatman or lack of Self and, within Vajrayana, the core 14 root vows as well as the branch vows of one's particular practice lineage. Within the context of these there is a tremendous diversity of method. If one does not accept the four noble truths and the truth of emptiness, then one is not a Buddhist. If one acts in wanton disregard of the 14 root vows and teaches others to do likewise, then one is not a practitioner of Vajrayana. One cannot judge a Terton by his or her actions in a normal fashion. But it is possible to judge the quality of a Terton's teachings and the Terton themselves by whether or not their terma or actions break the 14 root vows or deny the basic axioms of the Buddhist path. Neither Padmasambhava nor any Terton would demean the 14 root vows by breaking, and teaching others to disregard, the first and second vows; or by teaching people how to find their true "Self." For a wide variety of verifiable reasons, it is my view that Surya Das has and does do this. Therefore, through valid reasoning and logical deduction consistent with the context in which the argument is taking place, I conclude that Surya Das cannot be considered either a Terton or a Buddha.
It is my feeling, after a careful reading of all Surya Das's books and website, as well as hearing him speak on more than one occasion, that his teachings distort the precious and sublime path of Tantra and Dzogchen in such a manner that they not only cease to function but could cause harm to sincere spiritual seekers. I do not believe that the popularization of Buddhadharma is worth the destruction of Buddhadharma. We will be left with a very popular corpse. I chose not to see Surya Das as a sofa, a tree, a Terton, Napoleon, a Yorkshire terrier or Padmasambhava. All of these would, in my opinion backed by careful reasoning and study, be invalid estimations of what Surya Das is. I think that he is most likely a sincere person with good intentions. But then, as my grandmother used to say, "The road to hell is paved with good intentions." I do not think Surya Das is an eternally self-existent heretic, only a heretic through the combination of aggregates and circumstances which currently define this momentary appearance of Surya Das but also, sadly, shape the patterns flowing into future moments.
Luckily for us all the Buddhadharma has always presented an endless stream of skillful means allowing each person to discover reality whether through the methods of monasticism, the ngak'phang path or in lay life - in every nook and cranny of life. As for your second question, yes I have heard of the koan "Does a dog have Buddha nature?" But that will be the topic of another letter.
I am glad that we live in a time when we can disagree and each speak our minds openly in freedom. We will go on disagreeing I am sure. May we never forget that those we disagree with have Buddha nature. May all beings be happy.